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I. INTRODUCTION 
Six years ago, Professor Robert Riggs began an annual 
survey of Supreme Court voting behavior designed to give some 
indication of the ideological leanings of individual Justices and 
the Court as a whole. 1 The survey has generally demonstrated 
the relatively consistent conservatism of the Rehnquist Court. 
This year's survey, however, suggests that-contrary to 
repeated assertions in the popular press2 (and even this series 
* Richard G. Wilkins is a Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University. 
** James L. Kimball III is a J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University, 1994. 
*** Troy R. Braegger is a J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University, 1994. 
1. The series began with Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Riggs retired from the faculty 
of the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 1992. Much of the introductory material in 
this article, as well as the descriptive parameters for the statistical classifications 
used herein, is drawn from Professor Riggs' earlier work. 
2. Linda Greenhouse, Court Serves Notice of Its Transformation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 1992, §4, at 3 ("David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas, have brought not 
just incremental change but a quantum shift in the Court's center of gravity .... 
The Rehnquist Court majority now has votes to spare and is ready to put its new 
power on display"); The Runaway Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, §4, at 
16 ("the Supreme Court is off and running on a course more radical than the 
Presidents who appointed most of the justices"); Joan Biskupic, Thomas' Victory 
Puts Icing on Reagan-Bush Court, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3026 (1991); Bob Cohn 
& David A. Kaplan, Supreme Conservatism: Will Justices Hunt Down ''Endangered 
Precedents"?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at 56 (Thomas' arrival "is likely only to 
accelerate the urge to purge past decisions"); David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Good 
for the Left. Now Good for the Right, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 20, 21, 22 ("the 
court did turn right face and proceeded at double time . . . . The 
conservatives . . . own the farm, and the ideological horses are already out of the 
barn"); Joan Biskupic, 1990-91 Term Marked by Surge in Conservative Activism, 49 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1829 (July 6, 1991) ("The appointees of Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George Bush have helped to form a seemingly invincible conservative 
majority that has moved with increasing boldness to execute a conservative 
1 
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itself)-the Rehnquist Court is not a conservative juggernaut. If 
anything, this year's statistical analysis indicates increasing 
moderation on the Court. 
Indeed, the statistics were unexpected enough that we 
considered subtitling this year's installment "The Conservative 
Revolution That Wasn't," or, perhaps more poetically 
(considering the explicit efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush 
to obtain a "conservative" Supreme Court), "The Emperor's 
New Court." Like the young boy who pointed out that the 
Emperor's tailor had left him naked, this article suggests that 
the current Court has not provided Presidents Reagan and 
Bush with as much conservative cloth as they might have 
hoped. 
II. MODE OF ANALYSIS 
The following statistical analysis is drawn from a 
tabulation of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases.3 
These categories are designed to demonstrate the attitudes of 
the Justices toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme 
Court decision-making-individual rights and judicial restraint. 
political agenda"); Marshall Ingwerson, High Court's Slide to the Right, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4, 1991, at 8 ("the overall drift of the court, to most court-
watchers, is at the least to consolidate the sharp rightward shift that began at the 
end of the Reagan presidency"); see also Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting 
Behavior: 1990 Term, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 25 (1992) (noting a slight liberal shift 
in swing-vote cases, but suggesting that "[t]hese surprising figures do not mean 
that the Court, against all odds, turned in a liberal direction this year even 
though purported conservatives on the Court had increased in number from five to 
six"); but see Linda Greenhouse, Moderates on Court Defy Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 5, 1992, §4, at 1. 
3. Nine of the categories are based on the nature of the issues or the 
character of the parties. These categories are as follows: 
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or political 
subdivisions, is opposed by a private party. 
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of its agencies or 
officials, is opposed by a private party. 
3) State criminal cases. 
4) Federal criminal cases. 
5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech, press, association, and free 
exercise of religion. 
6) Equal protection issues. 
7) Statutory civil rights claims. 
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related 
matters. 
9) Federalism issues. 
The tenth category tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the 
majority in cases decided by a single vote. 
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The tabulation of votes in each category, presented as Tables 1-
10, demonstrates (in admittedly broad strokes) the frequency 
with which individual Justices and the Court voted to protect 
individual rights4 and/or exercise judicial restraint. 5 
From the voting patterns, we attempt to determine 
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking 
"conservative" or "liberal" positions. As analyzed in our tables, 
a conservative position is inferred from a vote favoring the 
government, a vote against a claim of constitutional or 
statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, or a 
vote in favor of state (rather than federal) authority on 
federalism questions. A liberal position is inferred from a 
contrary vote. 6 
4. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the 
outcome of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as 
those detailing the resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), 
the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The Civil 
cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also involve individual rights, since these suits 
pit the government against persons asserting private rights. The federalism 
decisions outlined in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual rights 
because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. 
Nevertheless, in such cases the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny 
federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his rights. 
5. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference the legislature as the 
policy-making branch of government, respect for precedent, avoidance of 
constitutional questions when narrower grounds for decision exist, avoidance of 
unnecessary decisions, and respect for the Framers' intent (when ascertainable) in 
construing constitutional text. DeCisions on jurisdictional questions (Table 8) 
capture one aspect of judicial restraint-the relative propensity of the Justices to 
avoid unnecessary decisions. Decisions on individual rights also have implications 
for judicial restraint. As a hands-off policy, judicial restraint commonly favors the 
government rather than the individual whc claims rights against the government. 
This is so because the individual's attempt to obtain new rights usually requires 
the Court to overturn precedent or declare an existing statute unconstitutional. 
Judicial restraint is also likely to be identified with respect for the role of states 
within the federal system. 
6. These general rules, however, do not always give accurate indications of 
judicial ideology. A number of decisions in the 1991 Term were unanimous, 
indicating that the law or the facts of the case, or both, pointed so clearly one way 
that there was little room for play of liberal or conservative ideologies. 
In other cases, much fewer in number, the peculiar nature of the facts created 
a reverse of the expected relationship, with (for example) liberals voting against 
and conservatives in favor of a criminal defendant. A good illustration is Evans v. 
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992). There, the majority affirmed a criminal 
conviction, rejecting the defendant's plea that the Court strictly construe the 
elements of extortion under the Hobbs Act. One would ordinarily expect Justice 
Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion, to apply the rule of lenity and construe 
the statute in favor of the criminal defendant. Likewise, one might expect the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas (possibly the three most conservative 
members of the Court) to have somewhat less sympathy for the criminal defendant. 
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To the extent the above inferences are valid, ideological 
trends can be noted by tracking the votes of the Justices and 
the Court in each category. The individual votes cast can be 
readily compared with those of other Justices for any given 
year to reckon ideological positions within the Court. 
Determination of the current ideological position of the Court 
as a whole, however, requires comparisons over time. For our 
analysis, the best available baseline is the comparable data 
generated for the five prior years. In the tables this 
information appears in the form of percentages for each Justice 
and, in all but the swing-vote table, for the Court majority. 
One must interpret the data with caution, since the 
percentages are affected not only by the behavior of the 
individual Justices but also by the factual and legal nature of 
the cases decided in a given year. One cannot be confident that 
percentage changes from one year to another reflect a change 
in the ideological orientation of an individual Justice, or that of 
the Court majority.7 Directional changes across a number of 
tables, however, would strengthen the hypothesis that a 
genuine shift in attitude has occurred. Although factual and 
legal variations may skew analysis of a given category of cases 
(producing unexpectedly ''liberal" or "conservative" results), it is 
unlikely that such factors would account for a pronounced 
directional change in several tables. 
This analytical scheme, of course, is far from perfect. 
Concern for individual rights and commitment to judicial 
restraint are not necessarily opposite poles of a single 
attitudinal dimension. Indeed, in certain instances, judicial 
restraint may be consistent with and even reinforce individual 
rights.8 Nevertheless, generally there is tension between 
Nevertheless, Stevens voted to affirm and the other three to reverse the 
conviction-the three dissenters apparently more concerned with adherence to 
precedent, federalism and separation of powers concerns than with any general 
predisposition against criminal defendants, 112 S. Ct. at 1894-1904 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J.), and the majority more 
concerned with "good government" and eradication of extortion than with generous 
application of the rule of lenity, 112 S. Ct. at 1885-90. 
7. Voting to uphold a greater percentage of criminal convictions than in a 
previous Term may mean that the Justice or the Court has become tougher on 
criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may mean only that this year the facts or the 
law (or both) of a number of individual cases were less favorable to the defendant 
than in previous years. The same is true of other categories of cases. 
8. For example, if existing precedent grants extensive protection to individual 
rights, a judge who resists efforts to undermine the precedent is exercising 
restraint and also acting to preserve individual rights. A striking example of this 
1] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1991 TERM 5 
individual rights and judicial restraint.9 Accordingly, in the 
tabulations that follow, data supporting an inference of judicial 
restraint or the lack thereof will generally be consistent, 
respectively, with either a narrow or broad view of individual 
rights. 
Ill. THE VOTING RECORD: MOVING TO THE CENTER 
With the replacement of Justice Marshall by Justice 
Thomas in 1991, we might have expected pronounced 
movement by the Court in a conservative direction. Indeed, as 
noted above, the supposed "conservatism" of the present Court 
has been widely discussed. 10 The data for this year, however, 
indicates that-rather than moving further to the right-the 
Court has moderated to a more centrist position and (perhaps) 
has experienced a modest liberal resurgence. 
During the 1991 Term, a directional change was apparent 
for the Court as a whole, as indicated by the percentage figures 
in the bottom three rows of each table.U Comparison of the 
majority outcome in 1991 cases with the outcomes from the 
1990 Term demonstrates a more liberal orientation in Tables 1, 
3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (state civil cases, state criminal cases, First 
Amendment issues, equal protection claims, statutory civil 
rights, jurisdiction, and federalism issues). Only Tables 2 and 4 
phenomenon in the 1991 Term is the Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter 
and Kennedy in Planned Parentlwod v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). There, while 
Justices O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy did not unequivocally endorse the abortion 
right first enunciated in Roe, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (refusing to "say whether each of 
us, had we been Members of the Court" when Roe was decided would have 
resolved the abortion question "as the Roe Court did"), they nevertheless refused to 
depart (on grounds of stare decisis) from the "central core" of Roe. 112 S. Ct. at 
2808-14 (Joint Opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.). Therefore, as Casey 
demonstrates, respect for precedent, avoidance of constitutional questions and 
unnecessary decisions, deference to states, and allegiance to the Framers' intent 
can cut either way with respect to individual rights, depending on the facts. 
9. Deference to legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, 
especially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis 
upon the framers' intent is often associated with unwillingness to read new 
individual rights into the Constitution. Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction 
leaves the matter to state courts with their possible bias in favor of actions by 
state governments, and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal vindication 
of her rights. 
10. See supra note 2. 
11. The first of the three rows gives the outcome on all cases included in the 
tables, whatever the voting alignment, while the second row is limited to decisions 
with one or more dissenting votes. The third row gives the outcome of the 
unanimous decisions in each category. 
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(federal civil and criminal cases) evidence a more conservative 
orientation than was exhibited in the 1990 Term. Moreover, 
most of these shifts (in both the liberal and conservative 
direction) are large.12 Indeed, only Table 7 (statutory civil 
rights) resulted in a rather insignificant percentage shift (2.26 
points). 
A similar shift is evident if one looks only at non-
unanimous decisions (i.e., opinions with at least one dissenting 
vote). Comparison of 1991 Term split decisions with those of 
1990 demonstrates a more liberal outcome in Tables 1, 3, 5, 7, 
8, and 9.13 The split decision figures, furthermore, show a 
greater point movement toward liberal outcomes in Tables 1, 3, 
7, 8 and 9 than the figures for all (including unanimous) 
cases. 14 For example, the relatively small (2.26 point) liberal 
shift in Table 7 becomes a potentially more significant 6. 7 point 
figure. This fact may be quite meaningful if one assumes that 
the outcome of split decisions is more likely to have been 
influenced by ideology than the outcome of unanimous cases. 
To the extent that split decisions are motivated by ideological 
differences on the Court, the pronounced liberal movement in 
the split decision figures is important indeed.15 
The movement noted above is also evident in Table 10, 
which analyzes cases decided by a 5-4 majority. Of the 17 
swing-vote decisions in the 1991 Term, 10 (or 58.82 percent) 
were decided by a liberal coalition. This represents a 13.32 
point shift toward greater liberalism than the 1990 Term. Such 
movement is hard to dismiss. A similar (but less dramatic) 
shift in the 1990 Term 16 was partially explained with the 
12. The movement toward a more liberal position was 11.62 points in Table 1, 
11.16 points in Table 3, 41.67 points in Table 5, 7.1 points in Table 6, 9.43 points 
in Table 8, and 45.31 points in Table 9. The change toward a more conservative 
position in Tables 2 and 4 was 20.95 and 9.23 points, respectively. 
13. As with the figures for all cases, the comparison of 1991 split decisions 
with 1990 evidences a conservative movement for Tables 2 and 4 (federal civil and 
criminal actions). 
14. Consideration of only split decisions creates a 17.19 point movement in 
Table 1, a 34.87 point movement in Table 3, a 6.7 point movement in Table 7, a 
30.33 point movement in Table 8, and a 51.43 point movement in Table 9. 
15. Only Table 6 (equal protection claims) shows no ideological movement 
between the 1991 and 1990 split decisions. Table 6 may well give the least reliable 
data regarding voting patterns on the Court. The table tabulated the results of 
only six decisions, four of which were unanimous. Any extrapolations drawn from 
such a small statistical sample are highly questionable. 
16. The 1990 Term itself demonstrated almost a 10 point increase in "liberal" 
decisions from 1989. Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voti'¥! Behavior: 1990 Term, 
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observation that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were 
part of a relatively solid six-member conservative bloc. 
Accordingly, the "liberal" 5-4 decisions did not accurately 
demonstrate the orientation of the Court because the basic 
"ideological cleavage on the Court" resulted in a conservative 6-
3 division. 17 This explanation, however, while still not without 
force, 18 loses some of its impact because of the emergence of 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter as anything but a 
reliably "conservative" bloc. Indeed, these Justices voted 
together with Justices Blackmun and Stevens (and therefore 
controlled) the outcome of five of the 10 split decisions decided 
by a liberal coalition in 1991.19 
The foregoing data suggests quite strongly that the 
monolithically "conservative" Rehnquist Court-so often 
discussed in the popular and academic press20-may be more 
storied than real. Indeed, consideration of the Court's most 
recent record in split decisions (where ideology ostensibly plays 
a greater role in Court decisionmaking) and swing decisions 
(where ideology often accounts for the decisive fifth vote) shows 
that the Rehnquist Court, as an institution, is moving more 
toward a centrist rather than a conservative position. We turn 
now to a detailed examination of individual voting behavior. 
6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 13-14 (1992). 
17. !d. 
18. See discussion infra Section III.F. 
19. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Forsyth County, 
Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992); Lee v. International Soc'y 
for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 
2649 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991). 
20. See supra note 2. 
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A. Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes for Government 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 30 12 71.43 84.0 70.3 66.7 67.9 71.8 
Thomas 25 10 71.43 
Scalia 27 15 64.29 64.0 64.9 59.2 51.7 64.1 
White 25 17 59.52 64.0 59.5 55.1 53.6 43.6 
Souter 21 19 52.50 63.6 
o·connor 21 21 50.00 68.0 67.6 57.4 50.0 64.1 
Kennedy 18 24 42.86 76.0 61.1 57.1 50.0 
Blackmon 15 27 35.71 24.0 43.2 30.6 44.8 36.8 
Stevens 12 29 29.27 36.0 40.5 35.4 37.9 46.2 
Majority 
All Cases 22 20 52.38 64.0 51.4 51.0 51.7 53.9 
Split 
Decisions 16 15 51.61 68.8 52.4 64.0 58.8 
Unanimous 6 54.55 55.6 50.0 50.0 37.5 41.7 
Table 1 reveals a change in voting patterns from 1990 that 
helps explain the general centrist reorientation of the Court 
just noted. That change is a rather remarkable shift in the 
voting patterns of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Their me-
teoric fall from the conservative "top of the chart" in 1990 to 
the liberal bottom in 1991 may suggest a judicial reorientation 
reminiscent of Justice Blackmun's well-known voyage from the 
right to the left wing of the Court. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and newly appointed Justice Thom-
as occupy the top position on Table 1, voting for state gov-
ernments 71.43% of the time.21 In the recent past, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy probably would have sat quite com-
fortably in second or third place. In 1991, however, Justice 
Kennedy has dropped 33.14 points-moving from second place 
21. Although Justices Rehnquist and Thomas share the same fmal voting per-
centage, Justice Thomas voted in seven fewer cases than Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
l 
I 
! 
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to seventh (just above Justice Blackmun). Justice O'Connor, in 
turn, has moved from third to sixth place, voting for the state 
only 50% of the time as opposed to 68% of the time in 1990. 
This movement by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may well 
explain the general, centrist drift of the Court during the 1991 
Term. Although these Justices maintained quite conservative 
voting records in federal civil and criminal matters (Tables 2 
and 4), they took a more liberal stance in 1991 on state crimi-
nal cases (Table 3), First Amendment issues (Table 5), equal 
protection claims (Table 6), civil rights claims (Table 7), juris-
dictional issues (Table 8), and federalism issues (Table 9). 
Although the change toward a liberal position in each of these 
areas was not uniformly large,22 such a consistent movement 
across all categories except cases involving the federal govern-
ment cannot be discounted-particularly in light of Justice 
O'Connor's and Kennedy's crucial roles in such "hot button" 
cases as Planned Parenthood v. Casey23 (abortion) and Lee v. 
Weisman24 (school prayer). 
Mter Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are repositioned, the 
remaining Justices have generally maintained their same rela-
tive placement. Justices Scalia, White and Souter each appear 
on the chart in the same order as in 1990, although they have 
each moved up a notch because of the repositioning of Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy. Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who 
occupied the bottom two places on Table 1 in 1990, remain in 
that niche-although reversing order (with Justice Blackmun 
in eighth and Justice Stevens in ninth place).25 
There is one other aspect of Table 1 that is worth noting. 
Justice Thomas' first place finish (tied with the Chief Justice) 
suggests that the new Justice will not disappoint those who 
hoped for a strong conservative voice on the bench. Indeed, ex-
cept for federal civil and criminal actions and equal protection 
claims (Tables 2, 4, and 6) (where Justice Thomas has either 
the first or second most liberal voting record in the 1991 
22. Justice O'Connor's voting record on civil rights claims, for instance, changed 
only 2.26 points. In other categories, however, the alteration was much more signif. 
icant. Her voting pattern in state criminal cases changed 33.37 points in a liberal 
direction, and she voted for the states on federalism issues only 39.13% of the time 
in 1991 as compared with 71.4% of the time in 1990. 
23. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
24. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
25. Justice Blackmun, along with Justice Scalia, were the only two Justices to 
vote somewhat more often for the state in 1991 than in 1990. 
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Term), the Justice evidences a relatively consistent (and con-
servative) voting pattern. He voted in favor of First Amend-
ment claims only 20% of the time (Table 5 ), was the member of 
the Court least likely to sustain a statutory civil rights claim 
(Table 7), is clearly on the conservative half of the Court when 
it comes to jurisdictional issues (Table 8), and sits in the fourth 
most conservative position on federalism issues (Table 9).26 
TABLE2 
CIVU.. CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes for Government 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term Term 
White 17 4 80.95 70.0 75.0 71.4 72.7 87.1 
Kennedy 16 5 76.19 55.6 60.7 66.7 58.3 
Rehnquist 15 6 71.43 70.0 78.6 71.4 61.8 90.6 
Scalia 15 6 71.43 57.9 60.7 59.3 62.5 82.8 
Souter 15 6 71.43 55.6 
Blackmun 12 9 57.14 60.0 64.3 60.7 50.0 53.1 
Stevens 12 9 57.14 40.0 57.1 42.9 55.9 50.0 
Thomas 8 7 53.33 
O'Connor 11 10 52.38 60.0 60.7 60.7 76.5 75.0 
Majority 
All Cases 17 4 80.95 60.0 71.4 64.3 61.8 68.8 
Split 
Decisions 10 2 83.33 60.0 66.7 66.7 55.6 
Unanimous 7 2 77.78 60.0 76.9 61.5 68.8 
Table 2, and Table 4, are the only two tables in 1991 show-
ing a general conservative trend in the Court's voting pattern. 
The federal government was able to garner a majority 80.95% 
of the time, a 20.95 point increase over 1990, when the federal 
government prevailed only 60% of the time. This significant 
victory level is the highest the federal government has 
achieved in the six years of this survey. 
But, while the overall trend in favor of the federal govern-
ment is clear (with only Justices Blackmun and O'Connor vot-
ing for the federal government fewer times than 1990 ), the 
26. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun tied for first place on Table 
9. 
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ranking of individual Justices within Table 2 appears almost 
random. As occurred in 1990, Justice White tops the list, vot-
ing for the government 80.95% of the time. Justice Kennedy 
comes in second, moving up from the sixth position in 1990. On 
the other end of the scale we find Justices O'Connor and 
Thomas, voting for the government 52.38% and 53.33% of the 
time, respectively. Considering Justice Thomas' showing in Ta-
ble 1, where he tied with Chief Justice Rehnquist for the most 
conservative voting record, his position in Table 2 is fairly sur-
prising. Almost as surprising is Justice O'Connor's shift from 
1990, when she tied for the second most conservative position 
on the chart. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, and 
Souter all tied for the third most conservative spot, coming in 
at 71.43% for the government. Justices Black.mun and Stevens 
also tied, voting 57.14% of the time for the government. 
It is difficult to explain precisely why the federal govern-
ment experienced such success in 1991, or why the ranking of 
individual Justices on Table 2 appears so erratic. The 
government's success rate may be due primarily to the efforts 
of Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, who is apparently doing a 
remarkable job of screening cases for the federal government 
and presenting the Court primarily with "winners." The United 
States is in the enviable position of being able to pick and 
choose the cases it wishes to take to the High Court, and the 
Solicitor General has traditionally been exceptionally careful in 
selecting federal vehicles for Supreme Court litigation.27 The 
high success rate in 1991 may mean little more than that So-
licitor General Starr is "on a roll." 
Some of the eccentricities of Table 2, however, may be ex-
plained by the peculiar nature of the decisions analyzed under 
the table. A vote in favor of the federal government in many 
civil cases simply cannot be classified, without more, as a "con-
servative" vote, nor is a vote against the government automat-
27. As is usually the case, the federal government won more of its cases 
(80.95%) than the states (52.3R%). This high comparative success rate on the part 
of the federal government may well be due, in part, to the Solicitor General's expe-
rienced and centralized control of the federal litigation docket. While the Solicitor 
General has traditionally managed federal cases to present the Supreme Court 
with cases most likely to result in decisions favorable to the government, state at-
torneys general have often not been as selective-and, accordingly, have often not 
been as successful. See generally Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: 
The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 1167 (19R8). (Professor 
Wilkins served as an Assistant to Solicitor General Rex E. Lee from 1981 to 1984.) 
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ically "liberal." For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Ticor Title Insurance Co. 28 the question before the Court was 
whether a state rate setting agency (controlled by the state's 
title insurance industry) was immune from prosecution under 
federal antitrust laws. In such a case, a vote in favor of the 
FTC (which argued against immunity) can hardly be called 
"conservative." To the contrary, the true "conservative" vote 
would seem to be against the federal government and in favor 
of the price fixers. 
Nevertheless, the six votes in favor of the federal govern-
ment in Ticor-including those of Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens-are (according to the classification scheme of this 
analysis) counted as "conservative" while the dissenting votes 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas 
are classified as "liberal." Such permutations, evident in other 
cases under Table 2,29 may partially explain both the high 
"conservative" success rate and the apparent unpredictability 
of the ranking of individual Justices. 
28. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). 
29. See also Lechmere v. National Labor Relations Bd., 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992). 
In Lechmere, the question was whether non-employee union organizers must be 
given access to an employer's property. Votes in favor of the NLRB (cast by Justic-
es White, Black.mun and Stevens) are hardly "conservative" (because these Justices 
would subjugate the property rights of employers to the organizational rights of 
unions), yet these votes-under the analysis of this article-count as "conservative" 
while the six votes of the Court majority (in favor of property rights) count as 
"liberal." 
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B. Criminal Cases 
TABLE3 
STATE CRilltiNAL CA.'>ES 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes for Government 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Scalia 14 4 77.78 74.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Thomas 12 4 75.00 
Rehnquist 12 6 66.67 81.5 85.3 85.2 73.7 87.9 
Souter 10 8 55.56 68.0 
White 10 8 55.56 48.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Kennedy 9 9 50.00 57.7 73.5 81.5 70.0 
Blackmun 6 12 33.33 14.8 35.3 37.0 26.3 30.3 
O'Connor 6 12 33.33 66.7 76.5 77.8 61.1 75.8 
Stevens 5 13 27.78 0.0 20.6 37.0 21.1 21.2 
Majority 
All Cases 8 10 44.44 55.6 64.7 70.4 47.4 60.6 
Split 
Decisions 8 33.33 68.2 70.0 72.7 53.8 
Unanimous 4 2 66.67 0.0 25.0 60.0 16.7 
Table 3 shows a voting pattern similar to that of Table 1, 
with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy again demonstrating a 
more liberal voting pattern than in the 1990 Term. As with 
Table 1, the most conservative group consists of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted for the 
government 77.78%, 75%, and 66.67% of the time, respectively. 
Justices Souter and White tied, voting for state government in 
55.56% of the cases examined. Justice Kennedy drops 7.7 
points from the 1990 Term, slipping from fifth to sixth place in 
Table 3. 
The final and most liberal group of Justices on Table 2 is 
comprised of Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens, who 
respectively voted in favor of the government 33.33%, 33.33%, 
and 27.78% of the time. These figures, however, represent 
"conservative" movement by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, 
with Justice Blackmun moving 18.53 points in favor of state 
government in 1991, and Justice Stevens-who did not vote for 
the state in a single criminal case in 1990-voting for the pros-
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ecution in 27.78% of the cases. The most surprising individual 
shift was by Justice O'Connor, who voted only half as often in 
favor of the state in 1991 as she did in 1990. 
The overall trend in state criminal cases was toward a more 
liberal position, since the state governments won only 44.44% 
of the time, as compared to 55.6% in 1990. This statistic is 
even more remarkable when one considers only split decisions, 
where state governments won just 33.33% of the time, as op-
posed to 68.2% in 1990. As noted above, this change in the 
orientation of the Court appears to be due largely to the repo-
sitioning of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. 
Justice 
Kennedy 
O'Connor 
Rehnquist 
Scalia 
Souter 
White 
Blackmun 
Thomas 
Stevens 
Majority 
All Cases 
Split 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
TABLE4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
1991 Term Votes %Votes for Government 
For Against 1991 
Gov't Gov't Term 
II 2 84.62 
10 3 76.92 
10 3 76.92 
10 3 76.92 
9 4 69.23 
9 4 69.23 
8 5 61.54 
6 5 54.55 
5 8 38.46 
9 4 69.23 
5 4 55.56 
4 0 100.00 
1990 1989 1988 
Term Term Term 
50.0 66.7 88.9 
70.0 77.8 77.8 
70.0 77.8 88.9 
40.0 66.7 66.7 
75.0 
60.0 77.8 88.9 
70.0 44.4 55.6 
60.0 33.3 66.7 
60.0 66.7 88.9 
50.0 83.3 100.0 
75.0 33.3 66.7 
1987 
Term 
71.4 
71.4 
85.7 
64.3 
85.7 
78.6 
64.3 
78.6 
75.0 
100.0 
1986 
Term 
90.0 
80.0 
70.0 
90.0 
30.0 
40.0 
60.0 
Table 4, like Table 2, evidences overall conservative voting 
patterns by most members of the Court. Justice Kennedy voted 
most often for the federal government, voting in favor of the 
federal government in 84.62% of all federal criminal cases. The 
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia tied for second 
place, with a 76.92% ranking. Justices White and Souter tied 
for third place at 69.23%. The bottom three slots are filled by 
Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Thomas30-with Justice 
30. Justice Thomas only participated in eleven of the thirteen cases. The two 
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Stevens possessing by far the most liberal record, siding with 
the federal government only 38.46% of the time. Compared 
with 1990, the overall trend is slightly conservative, with the 
government increasing its win percentage by 9.23 points. 
When compared with 1990, the above rankings reveal some 
fairly surprising movement. Justice Scalia-who was in last 
place in 1990, voting for the government only 40% of the 
time-moved up to second place in 1991. Similarly, Justice 
Kennedy-who in 1990 was tied with Justice Marshall for the 
second most liberal position on the chart-moved up to the 
first, most "conservative" position. Movement by the "liberal" 
wing of the Court, however, was not as surprising. Although 
the overall trend on the Table is conservative, the most liberal 
Justices on the Court (Justices Blackmun and Stevens) voted 
for the federal government fewer times in 1991, thereby taking 
a more liberal position than in 1990. Indeed, Justice Stevens 
dropped 21.54 points. 
As with Table 2, the Solicitor General's ability to present 
the Court with "winning'' cases may influence the generally 
favorable outcome for the federal government on Table 4. This 
supposition, in fact, is strengthened by an analysis of the out-
come in non-unanimous cases. When unanimous cases on Ta-
ble 4 are disregarded, the government wins only 55.56% (not 
69.23%) of the time. This demonstrates that the government 
does very well in unanimous cases-and these "winning" cases 
are the ones most likely to be pressed by the Solicitor Gener-
al.si 
cases in which he did not participate were decided unanimously for the govern-
ment. If he had participated in those cases and voted with the rest of the Court, 
his overall percentage would be equal to that of Justice Blackmun, 61.54%. This 
outcome is somewhat unexpected-due to Justice Thomas' generally conservative 
orientation on other Tables (e.g., Tables 1, 5, 7, 8 and 9). 
31. The four unanimous cases, each of which was decided for the government, 
were all drug-related. United States v. Ibarra, 112 S. Ct. 4 (1991); Griffin v. Unit-
ed States, 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991); United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992); 
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992). It appears that the Court supports, 
at least to some extent, the current "war on drugs." 
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c. Individual Rights 
TABLE5 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, 
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Justice 1991 Term Votes % Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Stevens 9 0 100.00 50.0 46.7 64.7 50.0 50.0 
Blackmun 8 88.89 69.2 60.0 41.2 69.2 72.7 
Souter 8 88.89 41.7 
Kennedy 7 77.78 41.7 40.0 37.5 66.7 
O'Connor 7 2 77.78 54.5 26.7 25.0 23.1 45.5 
Rehnquist 4 50.00 16.7 13.3 18.8 16.7 16.7 
White 4 50.00 15.4 20.0 23.5 30.8 41.7 
Scalia 3 5 37.50 25.0 26.7 35.3 38.5 36.4 
Thomas 4 20.00 
Majority 
All Cases 6 66.67 25.0 40.0 35.3 50.0 58.3 
Split 
Decisions 4 3 57.14 30.0 40.0 22.2 50.0 
Unanimous 2 100.00 0.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 
Table 5 reveals a striking shift from a conservative to a lib-
eral position, with the Court finding in favor of First 
Amendment claims 66.67% of the time, compared to only 25% 
of the time during the 1990 Term. But, while this movement 
by the entire Court may be somewhat unexpected, the ranking 
of individual Justices in Table 5 is not: the most liberal Justic-
es occupy the top and the most conservative Justices the bot-
tom of the chart. Perhaps the most telling aspect of Table 5, 
however, is the fact that it-like Tables 1 and 10-reveals 
what may be a new 5-4 centrist realignment of the Court. 
Justice Stevens occupies the top, most liberal position on 
Table 5-finding in favor of 100% of First Amendment claims. 
Justices Blackmun and Souter come next, finding in favor of 
all but one claim, for an overall result of 88.89%. The next po-
sitions are filled by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who found 
for the claim 77.78% of the time. Together, these five Justices 
can control the outcome of First Amendment cases, as demon 
I 
I 
t 
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strated in 1991 by Lee v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. 32 and Lee v. Weisman. 33 
Between the top five Justices and the next four is a signifi-
cant percentage break. The Chief Justice and Justice White 
found in favor of First Amendment claimants only half the 
time-27.78 points below the record of Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Thomas round out the conserva-
tive end of the scale, voting for 37.5% and 20% of the claims, 
respectively. These Justices, of course, populated the dissents 
of the First Amendment decisions noted above. 
One should not, perhaps, make too much of the obvious lib-
eral shift in First Amendment cases in 1991. The shift may be 
explained, at least in part, by the nature of the cases reaching 
the Court, since every Justice voted for First Amendment 
claims more in 1991 than 1990. Also, there were no unanimous 
cases in 1990, while in 1991 there were two-both decided for 
the claim.34 But, notwithstanding these observations, the pres-
ence of Justices Souter, Kennedy and O'Connor on the liberal 
side of Table 5 has tipped the balance of the chart to a liberal 
position-as on Tables 1 and 10. The Court as a whole, more-
over, has a more liberal record in 1991 than 1990 on all but 
two Tables included in this study. This movement, taken as a 
whole, does not appear to be insignificant. 
As a result, Table 5-viewed in context with other Tables in 
this study-suggests that ideological control on the Court may 
well have shifted since the 1990 Term. The liberal wing of the 
Court (Justices Blackmun and Stevens) is often joined by a 
moderate center (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) to 
produce liberal outcomes. While this may be insufficient evi-
dence upon which to confidently predict a change in the 
Court's sea level, it does suggest that-at least in the 1991 
Term-the tide has turned. 
32. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992). 
33. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Weisman is not included in the calculation of Table 
5. As explained in the appendix to this study, Establishment Clause challenges are 
omitted from Table fi because one party's claim of religious establishment is often 
aligned against another party's claim of free exercise or other individual right, thus 
blurring the issue of individual rights. 
34. The unanimity of the Court in one of these cases, however, masks serious 
doctrinal disagreement. See, e.g, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) 
(Court unanimously invalidates cross burning statute, but on two widely divergent 
rationales). 
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TABLES 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Stevens 4 2 66.67 83.3 0.0 66.7 28.6 33.3 
Thomas 3 2 60.00 
Blackmun 3 3 50.00 83.3 0.0 60.0 50.0 57.1 
Kermedy 3 3 50.00 42.9 25.0 57.1 33.3 
Rehnquist 3 3 50.00 14.3 20.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Souter 3 50.00 50.0 
White 3 3 50.00 42.9 0.0 66.7 12.5 28.6 
O'Connor 2 4 33.33 28.6 25.0 66.7 12.5 42.9 
Scalia 4 33.33 14.3 25.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Majority 
All Cases 3 3 50.00 42.9 0.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Split 
Decisions 50.00 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Unanimous 2 2 50.00 33.3 0.0 50.0 20.0 
Table 6 shows a slight liberal shift, but the significance of 
this shift may well be negligible. Four cases were decided by a 
unanimous Court, two for the claim and two against. This 
leaves only two cases in which ideology may have played a 
significant role. Such a small number of cases makes any sig-
nificant statistical analysis difficult, if not impossible. 
With the above caveat in mind, the rankings on Table 6 are 
not unexpected. Indeed, in the non-unanimous cases, the vot-
ing pattern does not diverge significantly from 1990. Justice 
Stevens voted for the claim in both non-unanimous cases. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Thomas, Ken-
nedy, Souter, and White split, voting for the claim 50% of the 
time. Justices O'Connor and Scalia, finally, voted against both 
claims. Compared to 1990, the only noticeable shift was that of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted for the equal protection 
claim 50% of the time in 1991 as opposed to 1990's 14.3%. It 
bears repeating, however, that the limited number of split 
decisions renders suspect any conclusions concermng 
ideological trends. 
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TABLE 7 
STATUTORY CIVll. RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Justice 1991 Term Votes % Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Tertn Term Term Term Term Term 
Blackmun 8 88.89 80.0 88.9 80.0 87.5 84.6 
Stevens 8 88.89 80.0 77.8 73.7 87.5 61.5 
White 6 66.67 53.3 88.9 55.0 62.5 61.5 
Kennedy 4 55.56 33.3 62.5 45.0 66.7 
O'Connor 4 55.56 53.3 55.6 52.6 42.9 30.8 
Rehnquist 5 44.44 33.3 44.4 35.0 37.5 38.5 
Scalia 5 44.44 46.7 55.6 40.0 57.1 38.5 
Souter 5 44.44 57.1 
Thomas 2 5 28.57 
Majority 
All Cases 55.56 53.3 88.9 50.0 75.0 53.9 
Split 
Decisions 40.00 33.3 83.3 25.0 60.0 
Unanimous 3 75.00 83.3 100.0 87.5 100.0 
Table 7 reveals a modest liberal shift. The liberal movement 
for the Court as a whole, however, is quite small-2.26%. In-
deed, were it not for the fact that so many Tables reflect a 
liberal shift in 1991, this movement would probably be disre-
garded altogether. Viewed in light of other changes in voting 
patterns in 1991, however, even a movement this small may be 
significant. Moreover, when one considers the outcome of only 
non-unanimous cases, the shift becomes a more substantial 6.7 
points. 
Table 7 also evidences movement by Justice Kennedy simi-
lar to that found on Tables 1, 5 and 10. Justice Kennedy moves 
from the bottom, most conservative position on Table 7 in 1990 
to a ranking in the top five most liberal Justices-voting for 
55.56% of statutory civil rights claims in 1991, as opposed to 
33.3% of such claims in the 1990 Term. Justice White also 
moved up the chart in 1991, adding 13.37 points to his record 
in 1990. Justice Souter, by contrast, moved in a conservative 
direction, dropping 12.66 points from his record in 1990. The 
remaining Justices voted largely as expected, with Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens voting for the claim most often, 88.89% 
of the time, and with Justice Thomas at the opposite end of the 
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scale, voting for the claim only 28.57% of the time. 
The conservative position of Justice Thomas on Table 7 is 
worth noting. Justice Thomas' record on Table 7 appears to 
fulfill at least some of the conservative hopes that surrounded 
his confirmation. But this is not all. His conservative presence 
on the Court also lends added importance to the slight overall 
liberal shift reflected on Table 7. Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
whom Justice Thomas replaced, led the field on Table 7 in 
1990, voting for the claim 86.7% of the time. In spite of the re-
placement of 1990's most liberal Justice in this category by 
1991's most conservative, the overall results on Table 7 still 
gravitated to the left. This phenomenon indicates that-despite 
the relatively small liberal shift in Table 7-a significant reori-
entation of the Court may well have taken place. 
D. Jurisdiction and Justiciability Questions 
TABLES 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF ,JURISDICTION 
Justice 1991 Term Votes % Votes for Jurisdiction 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Juris. Juris. Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Souter 21 7 75.00 57.6 
Stevens 21 7 75.00 91.4 68.0 73.0 57.1 71.4 
Kennedy 22 8 73.33 58.3 64.0 51.4 56.3 
Blackrnun 20 8 71.43 80.0 79.2 64.9 58.1 64.3 
White 20 () 68.97 63.9 68.0 62.2 51.2 71.4 
Thomas 16 8 66.67 
o·connor 19 11 63.33 54.3 68.0 51.4 42.9 64.3 
Rehnquist 18 11 62.07 54.3 60.0 51.4 47.9 67.9 
Scalia 16 13 55.17 48.5 60.0 50.0 36.6 61.5 
Majority 
All Cases 22 8 73.33 63.9 64.0 62.2 55.8 60.7 
Split 
Decisions 9 69.23 38.9 33.0 62.5 71.4 
Unanimous 13 76.47 88.9 81.3 61.9 48.3 
Table 8 demonstrates a significant shift in favor of liberal 
outcomes on jurisdictional issues, with the Court ruling in fa-
vor of jurisdiction 73.33% of the time, compared to only 63.9% 
in 1990. The liberal outcome in split decisions is even more 
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notable, with the Court asserting jurisdiction in 69.23% of 
these cases, a 30.33 point increase from the 1990 Term. 
The individual rankings for the bottom half of Table 8 are 
not particularly surprising. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Scalia maintain the same relative positions 
they occupied in the 1990 Term-with Justice Scalia being the 
member of the Court least likely to uphold a jurisdictional 
claim. Justice White maintains a position in the middle of the 
chart, and Justice Thomas exhibits a voting record roughly 
comparable to those of the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor. 
But, while the bottom half of Table 8 may be predictable, the 
top half reveals some fairly surprising movement by Justices 
who, according to popular theory, should vote in a "conserva-
tive" or ''liberal" fashion. 
For example, Justice Souter (a supposed "conservative") ties 
with Justice Stevens (a traditionally "liberal" Justice) as the 
member of the Court most likely to assert federal jurisdiction, 
finding in favor of jurisdictional claims 75% of the time. Jus-
tice Kennedy similarly exhibits a more liberal voting record in 
1991, adding 15.03 points to his record from 1990 and moving 
into a position 1.67 points behind Justices Souter and Stevens 
and 1.9 points ahead of Justice Blackmun. In counterpoise to 
the movement of .Justices Souter and Kennedy, however, is the 
record of Justices Stevens and Blackmun. Although they main-
tain positions high on the "liberal" end of Table 8, Justices 
Stevens and Blackmun actually voted more conservatively in 
1991, dropping 16.4 and 8.57 points respectively from their 
1990 records. 
The pronounced liberal movement in Table 8 must be due, 
at least in part, to the nature of the cases addressed by the 
Court in 1991. Six Justices (the Chief Justice, White, 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Souter) voted more frequently 
in favor of jurisdiction in 1991 than 1990, with only two mem-
bers of the Court (Justices Blackmun and Stevens) asserting 
jurisdiction less frequently. This suggests that the nature of 
the cases-and not just judicial ideology-was playing a 
significant role in 1991. This supposition is strengthened by 
the fact that, of the 28 cases raising a jurisdictional question, 
13 were decided unanimously in favor of the jurisdictional 
claim 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the evident shift on Table 8 
is simply the result of an aberrant universe of cases. The sta-
tistics on split decisions (which exclude the unanimous deci-
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sions) show even greater liberal movement than the statistics 
for all (including unanimous) decisions. Moreover, the percent-
age of votes favoring jurisdiction in 1991 is the highest it has 
been since the inception of this survey. Finally, Table 8, like 
Tables 1, 5, and 7, demonstrates significant movement by sup-
posedly "conservative" Justices (here, Justices Souter and Ken-
nedy) into the "liberal" ranks.35 
The above factors suggest that the movement on Table 8 is 
significant. Whether it portends a long-term change in direc-
tion for the Court only time will tell. But, at least for 1991, Ta-
ble 8 demonstrates that the Court was much more willing to 
rule in favor of jurisdictional claims than one would expect 
from a staunchly "conservative" body. 
35. The movement by Justices Souter and Kennedy noted above is not the re-
sult of their participation in the large number of unanimous cases raising a juris-
dictional challenge. The same movement is evident even if one considers only their 
ranking in the outcome of split decisions. 
TABLE SA 
JUltL'IDICTION··SPLIT DECISIONS 
Justice For Claim Against Claim 1991 Term 
Stevens 9 75.00 
Kennedy 9 4 69.23 
Souter 8 66.67 
Blackmun 8 4 66.67 
White 8 61.54 
Thomas 6 6 50.00 
O'Connor 6 7 46.15 
Rehnquist 5 7 41.67 
Scalia 9 30.77 
Total 9 69.23 
v 
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E. Federalism Issues 
TABLE9 
FEDERALISM CASES 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes for State Claim 
For For 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
State U.S. Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Blackmun 10 13 43.48 14.3 43.8 40.9 46.2 
Rehnquist 10 13 43.48 71.4 56.3 81.0 46.2 
O'Connor 9 14 39.13 71.4 56.3 73.7 33.3 
Souter 14 36.36 83.3 
Thomas 7 13 35.00 
Rtevens 15 31.82 28.6 43.8 57.1 46.2 
White 7 16 30.43 57.1 43.8 63.6 30.8 
Kennedy 6 17 26.09 71.4 56.3 72.7 33.3 
Reali a 6 17 26.09 71.4 56.3 76.2 30.8 
Majority 
All Cases 6 17 26.09 71.4 43.8 59.1 38.5 
Split 
Decisions 4 10 28.57 80.0 25.0 50.0 33.3 
Unanimous 7 22.22 50.0 50.0 70.0 42.9 
Table 9 deals with questions raised by conflict between fed-
eral and state governmental authority.36 In examining these 
issues, we assume that the more conservative Justices will 
tend to favor state authority, while the liberal Justices will 
tend to support federal authority. On its face, Table 9 suggests 
a sharp shift to the left, with the Court deciding for the federal 
government 73.91% of the time, as compared to only 28.6% in 
1990. The same shift is evident in the statistics for split deci-
sions, where the Court ruled for the federal government 
71.43% of the time. This pronounced movement results in the 
most liberal voting record for the Court as a whole since the 
inception of this study. 
Almost as surprising as the above statistics is the reorien-
tation of individual Justices on Table 9. Justice Blackmun, who 
in 1990 voted for the state government only once (and then in 
36. See Appendix A for a more detailed statement of the criteria for inclusion 
in this category. 
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a unanimous case), exhibited a considerably more conservative 
record in 1991, tying with Chief Justice Rehnquist for first 
place on Table 9 by voting in favor of the state in 10 out of 23 
cases. By contrast, Justices Kennedy and Scalia-who in 1990 
joined the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor in voting for the 
state 71.4% of the time-dropped precipitously to a two-way tie 
for last place, voting for the state only 26.09% of the time. As a 
result, the rankings on Table 9 are quite unexpected, with 
staunchly liberal Justice Blackmun in the most "conservative" 
position and staunchly conservative Justice Scalia in the most 
"liberal" slot. 
The unusual rankings described above are difficult to ex-
plain. They do not appear to be the result of the relatively 
large number of unanimous cases (seven) decided in favor of 
the United States in 1991. Indeed, if one removes the unani-
mous cases from Table 9 (seven for the federal government and 
two for the state), the rankings of the individual Justices (as 
well as the relative percentages of cases decided in favor of the 
state) remain essentially unchanged.37 
The significance of the unusual ranking in Table 9, however, 
may be limited. In spite of the large number of cases included 
on Table 9, there are only a few votes separating the ideologi-
37. Table 9A reflects the same data as is demonstrated in Table 9 with the 
unanimous cases removed. 
TABLE 9A 
FEDERALISM CASES--SPLIT DECISIONS 
Justice For State For U.S. 1991 Term 
Blackmun 8 6 57.14 
Hehnquist 8 6 57.14 
O'Connor 7 7 50.00 
Souter 6 7 46.15 
Thomas 6 7 46.15 
Stevens 6 8 42.86 
White 9 35.71 
Kennedy 4 10 28.57 
Scalia 10 28.57 
Total 4 10 28.57 
The modified table does reveal a larger spread between the most conservative and 
the most liberal positions. And although the gap increases from 17.39 to 28..'i7 
points, no clear ideological schism develops. 
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cal poles-with the consequence that the unpredictable rank-
ings on the Table are the result of voting differences in a fairly 
narrow range. As a result, the precise rankings of individual 
Justices on Table 9 may not be terribly meaningful.38 What is 
more significant is the fact that the Court, as a whole, took a 
decidedly more liberal position on federalism issues in 1991 
than 1990. 
F. Swing-Vote Analysis 
TABLE 10 
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN 
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES 
Justice 1991 Term Votes %Votes with Majority 
For Against 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Maj. Maj. Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Souter 14 3 82.35 59.1 
Blackmun 12 5 70.59 47.8 33.3 38.2 45.2 
Kennedy II G 64.71 52.2 71.4 82.4 71.4 
White 11 6 64.71 60.9 78.6 76.5 77.4 
O'Connor 10 7 58.82 69.6 69.0 76.5 64.5 
Stevens 10 7 58.82 47.8 42.9 26.5 61.3 
Rehnquist 7 10 41.18 69.6 66.7 76.5 70.0 
Scalia 6 II 35.29 52.2 66.7 73.5 66.7 
Thomas 4 10 23.53 
Conservative 
Coalition 7 10 41.18 54.5 64.3 76.5 64.5 
Liberal 
Coalition 10 7 58.82 45.5 35.7 23.5 35.5 
We identified 17 "swing-vote" decisions for the 1991 Term. 
In these cases, a shift of a single Justice from the majority to 
3R. The random outcome on Table 9 can also perhaps be explained by a small 
number of cases that seem to defy ideological classification. In Fort Gratiot Sani-
tary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), 
and Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 112 S. Ct. 2365 
(1992), the Court decided for the United States by a 7-2 vote. In both cases the 
dissenters were Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist, hardly ideological 
soulmates. In Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct. 
2447 (1992), the Court by a 6-3 margin found for the State of Wisconsin. In that 
case, Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, again 
joining the "liberal" and "conservative" wings of the Court. Such unexpected coali-
tions can explain the unusual rankings on Table 9, particularly in light of the 
small number of decisions that affect that ranking. 
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the minority coalition would create a new majority and a dif-
ferent result.39 We call this "swing-vote" analysis because it 
identifies members of the Court who most frequently shift or 
"swing" from one voting coalition to another in order to form 
majorities. Because each vote is crucial to the outcome of a 
case decided by a single vote, swing-voting is an important in-
dex of ideological influence on Court decision-making.40 In 
1991, the swing-vote table suggests a significant resurgence of 
liberal influence on the Court. 
Within the top six positions on Table 10 we find the two 
most consistently "liberal" Justices, Blackmun and Stevens; 
Justice White, who has traditionally been a swing-vote leader; 
and Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy, who played a 
significant role in the outcome of many 1991 swing-vote cases. 
Far down the list we find the plainly conservative wing of the 
Court, the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas. As 
this ranking suggests, liberal coalitions generally controlled 
the outcome of 1991's swing-vote cases. Indeed, liberal coali-
tions won ten out of the seventeen swing-vote cases. This con-
trasts markedly with 1990's results, when Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens were at the bottom of the chart, with 
conservative Justices filling the top positions. 
This is not the first year that the liberal forces on the Court 
have increased their influence in swing-vote outcomes. A less 
significant liberal shift was noted in 1990's swing-vote analy-
sis.41 Professor Riggs, however, hypothesized that this did 
::!9. Fourteen of these decisions were made by a 5·4 vote. These, and three 5-::l 
decisions, are included in the table. The usual "swing-vote case" is a 5-4 decision, 
but a 5-::l decision is included if it reverses or sets aside the lower court decision 
because, in such a situation, a shift of one vote from the majority to the minority 
would change the outcome to an affirmance by an equally divided Court. A 5-::l 
affirmance is not included, however, because the lower court decision would be af-
firmed without opinion by a 4-4 vote. 
40. The archetypal swing voter on the Court is a person not staunchly commit-
ted to a liberal or a conservative position who votes sometimes with one group and 
sometimes with the other, making the crucial difference on close cases. Justice 
White has to some extent filled this role in recent years. During the 1987 term, 
the first year that swing-vote analysis was included in this survey, Justice White 
voted most frequently with the majority. Justice Kennedy was the most frequent 
swing voter in 1988, and Justice White again took that role in 1989. In 1990, Jus-
tices O'Connor and Rehnquist tied as the most influential Justices in close cases. 
In 1991, Justice Souter fills the position as most frequent swing voter, voting with 
the majority in 82.::!5% of swing-vote cases. 
41. Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1990 Term, 6 B.Y.U. J. 
PUB. L. 1, 25 (1992). 
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"not mean that the Court, against all odds, turned in a liberal 
direction," but rather indicated that cases with strong ideolog-
ical content were being decided by a conservative 6-3 majori-
ty.42 An examination of the cases decided by a 6-3 margin 
continues to lend some support to this hypothesis. 
TABLE lOA 
6-3 DECL'>IONS FOR 1991 TERM 
justice In In %In 
Majority Dissent Majority 
Kennedy 20 86.96 
Souter 17 5 77.27 
O'Connor 17 G 73.91 
Scalia 17 6 73.91 
White 17 6 73.01 
Rehnquist 15 8 65.22 
Thom'!s 14 8 63.64 
Stevens 11 12 47.R3 
Blackmun R 15 34.78 
Table lOA suggests that the two most liberal members of 
the Court do not control the outcome of 6-3 decisions. Indeed, 
there is a clear break between Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens-the bottom two Justices on the chart-and the top 
seven. We can assume from this division that Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens-while often able to attract one other 
vote43-were unable to get another vote to push the cases into 
the swing-vote category. As a result, the swing-vote table may 
somewhat exaggerate liberal influence on the Court. 
Nevertheless, the data from the 1991 Term swing-vote cate-
gory cannot be readily dismissed. The fact remains that a lib-
42. !d. at 2fi-26. 
43. These two Justices, though frequently able to garner a third vote, were of-
ten unable to do so, as can be seen from the following cases in which they were 
the sole dissenters against a seven- or six-vote majority: Ardestani v. Immigration 
and Naturalization Serv., 112 S. Ct. fi1fi (1991); Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 
1::!86 (1992); Benten v. Kessler, 112 S. Ct. 2929 (1992); Denton v. Hemande.z, 112 S. 
Ct. 1728 (1992); Gome.z v. United States District Court for Northern District of 
California, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992); Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk 
County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (6-2); Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); 
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992); Zatko v. California, 
112 S. Ct. :ififi (1991). 
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eral coalition did control the outcome of a majority of the 
swing-vote decisions. Moreover, that coalition included Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter five times.44 These three Jus-
tices, furthermore, are also at the top of Table lOA, which 
shows that they often control the outcome of 6-3 decisions. 
When such a powerful bloc of Justices evidences a willingness 
to reach liberal results-as they undoubtedly have in 1991-it 
is a development that cannot be pushed aside as a statistical 
aberration. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter may well 
be attempting to mitigate the much-anticipated conservative 
shift of the Rehnquist Court. Rather than propelling it to the 
right, the voting behavior of these three Justices is keeping the 
Court in the middle of the road. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Pontification regarding the supposedly conservative judicial 
juggernaut created by Presidents Reagan and Bush has con-
tinued apace for some time.45 Indeed, members of the Su-
preme Court have sometimes themselves expressed concern 
that liberal monuments of the past were about to be relegated 
to legal history.46 The 1991 Term, however, suggests that the 
pundits-if not wrong-have at least overstated their case, and 
that the Court-despite the misgivings of some of its 
members-is not about to dash its past handiwork upon the 
shoals. Indeed, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of judicial 
liberalism's demise have been greatly exaggeratedY The 1991 
voting patterns explored above demonstrate that the Court is 
voting more often in favor of individual rights and less often in 
44. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Forsyth County, Ga. 
v. National Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krish-
na Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); 
Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2102 (1992). 
45. See supra note 2. 
46. See. e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2623 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "taking into account the majority's addi-
tional criterion for overruling-that a case either was decided or reaffirmed by a 5-
4 margin 'over spirited dissen[t],' [cite omitted]-the continued vitality of literally 
scores of decisions must be understood to depend on nothing more than the pro-
clivities of the individuals who now comprise a majority of this Court." After mak-
ing this assertion, Justice Marshall then proceeded to name a number of cases that 
the "majority's additional criterion" would place on the "endangered precedents 
list." Id. at 2623 n.2. 
47. In a cable from Europe to the Associated Press, Mark Twain is supposed to 
have said, "The report of my death was an exaggeration." The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations 550 (2d ed. 1953). 
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favor of judicial restraint than most observers have expected. 
In short, if the assumptions that have guided this statistical 
study since its inception are broadly accurate, the 
monolithically Republican Court is not behaving in a 
monolithically conservative fashion. 
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V. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria for Selection and Classification 
of Cases 
1. The universe of cases 
Only cases decided during the 1991 Term by a full opinion 
setting forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. 
Decisions on motions are exch1ded, even if accompanied by an 
opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are included if 
accompanied by a full opinion of the Court, but not if the only 
opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-to-four vote, hence 
resulting in affirmance without written opinion, are excluded. 
Both signed and per curiam opinions are considered full opin-
ions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory man-
ner. Cases not fitting any of the ten categories are, of course, 
not included in the data base for any of the tables. 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows com-
monly accepted definitions; generally, the nature of the case is 
clearly identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case 
pose a problem of classification. No cases in 1991 raised such a 
question. 
3. Cases classified by nature of the parties-Tables 1 
through 4 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmen-
tal and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is 
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded 
from these tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The gov-
ernmental entity might be the government itself, one of its 
agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one 
of its political subdivisions. A suit against an official in her 
personal capacity is included if she is represented by govern-
ment attorneys or if the interests of the government are other-
wise clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil 
case is excluded if governmental entities appear on both sides 
of the controversy. If both a state and a federal entity are 
parties to the same suit on the same side with only private 
parties on the other, the case is included in Tables 1 and 2. A 
case is included more than once in the same table if it raises 
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two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case 
and the issues are resolved by differing voting alignments. 
4. Classification by nature of the issue-Tables 5 through 9 
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 for 
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the writ-
ten opinion(s). One case may thus be included in two or more 
tables. A case is also included more than once in the same 
table if it raises two or more distinct issues in that category 
affecting the disposition of the case and if the issues are re-
solved by differing voting alignments. A case is not included 
for any issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is 
not addressed in any opinion. 
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection 
issues poses no special problem. In each instance, the nature of 
the claim is expressly identified in the opinion. Issues of free-
dom of speech, press, association, and free exercise of religion 
are included. Establishment Clause cases are excluded, howev-
er, because one party's claim of religious establishment is often 
arrayed against another party's claim of free exercise or some 
other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individual 
rights. 
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are 
limited to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the 
civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physi-
cal handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are in-
cluded if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal 
statute or if the issue is the application of section 1983-that 
is, whether or how that section's protections apply in the case 
at hand. However, section 1983 actions are excluded if the sub-
stantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitu-
tion and the issue relates to the constitutional right. The pur-
pose of the section 1983 exclusion is to preserve a distinction 
between constitutional and non-constitutional claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include 
not only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripe-
ness, abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Juris-
dictional questions are excluded if neither party challenges 
jurisdiction and no member of the Court dissents on the ques-
tion, even though the Court may comment on its jurisdiction. 
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Table 9 (federalism cases) is limited to issues raised by 
conflicting actions of federal and state or local governments. 
Common examples are preemption, intergovernmental immu-
nities, application of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a 
limit on action by the federal government, and federal court 
interference with state court activities (other than review of 
state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or in-
terstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant 
commerce clause or the privileges and immunities clause, are 
excluded from the table. 
5. The ((swing-vote" cases 
Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a 
single vote. This category also is intended to include four-to-
three decisions, if any, as well as five-to-three and four-to-two 
decisions resulting in reversal of a lower court decision. 
Mfirmances by a vote of five-to-three or four-to-two are not 
included because a shift of one vote from the majority to the 
minority position would still result in affirmance, by a tie vote. 
A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two 
or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and 
the issues are resolved by differing five-to-four (four-to-three, 
etc.) voting alignments. 
B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State/Local Government versus Private Party 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992) 
Barker v. Kansas, 112 S. Ct. 1619 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) 
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) 
City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992) 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (Unanimous) 
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 
S. Ct. 683 (1992) (2 issues; 1 was unanimous) 
Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728 (1992) 
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992) 
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 112 
S. Ct. 2019 (1992) 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management, 112 S. Ct. 2375 (1992) 
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 112 S. Ct. 560 (1991) (Thomas, 
J., did not participate) 
Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) 
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International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) 
Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 112 S. Ct. 2365 
(1992) 
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) 
(Per curiam) 
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (Souter, J., did 
not decide this issue) 
Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991) (Per curiam; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 20~H (1992) (Souter, J., did not 
participate) 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) 
Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (4 issues, 1 of which Stevens, J., 
did not decide) 
Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (2 issues; 1 of which was unani-
mous) 
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not 
participate) 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) 
(Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Smith v. Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992) 
(2 issues; 1 of which was unanimous) 
Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992) 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party 
Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) (Thomas, 
J., did not participate) 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 
459 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas did not participate) 
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992) 
Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) 
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. fi34 (1991) (Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (2 issues; 1 
of which was unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, 
Inc., 112 S. Ct. fi51 (1991) (Unanimous) 
Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) 
McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992) (Unanimous) 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992) 
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992) (Unanimous) 
United States Department of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. fi41 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, 
J., did not participate) 
United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) 
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992) 
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102 (1992) 
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Table 3: State Criminal Cases 
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) 
Espinosa v. Flr)rida, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992) (Per curiam) 
Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) (2 issues; 1 was unanimous; Thomas, J., did 
not participate) 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 17RO (1992) 
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) 
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 17lli (1992) 
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) 
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112.S. Ct. 253R (1992) (Unanimous) 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (2 issues) 
Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) 
Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547 (1992) (Per curiam; Unanimous) 
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases 
Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992) 
Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) 
Griffm v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not partici-
pate) 
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) 
United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Ibarra, 112 S. Ct. 4 (1991) (Per curiam; Unanimous; Thomas, J., did 
not participate) 
United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329 (1992) 
United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 21iDa (1992) 
United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1nli (1992) 
United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351 (1992) 
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992) 
Table 5: Cases Raising a Challenge to First Amendment Rights of Expression, 
Association, and Free Exercise of Religion 
Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) 
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) 
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2.'39/'i (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., and Scalia, Thomas, and White, JJ., did not address this issue) 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) 
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) 
(Per curiam) 
Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not participate) 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) 
(Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Table 6: Cases Involving Equal Protection Claims 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Ford, 112 S. Ct. 2184 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) 
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Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) 
Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547 (1992) (Per curiam; Unanimous) 
United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims 
Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) (Thomas, 
J., did not participate) 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) 
Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) 
Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) 
United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992) 
Table 8: Cases Involving Jurisdictional Issues 
American National Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992) 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 
459 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992) 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (2 issues) 
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) 
McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2081 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., and 
Blackmum and Stevens, JJ., did not decide jurisdiction issue; Souter, J., did not 
participate) 
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (Unanimous; Blackmun, Stevens 
and White, JJ., did not specifically decide) 
Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992) (Unanimous; Scalia, J., did not specifically 
decide; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Smith v. Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) 
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992) 
Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547 (1992) (Per curiam; Unanimous) 
United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) 
United States v. Ibarra, 112 S. Ct. 4 (1991) (Per curiam; Unanimous; Thomas, J., did 
not participate) 
United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1785 (1992) (Thomas, J., did not decide the issue) 
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494 
(1991) (Unanimous; Thomas, J., did not participate) 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992) 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (2 issues, 1 of which Souter, J., did not 
decide; both were unanimous) 
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Table SA: Jurisdiction-Split Decisions 
American National Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992) 
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992) 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (2 issues) 
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) 
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